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Procedural Default:
A De Facto Exception to Civility?
Ashley Flynn*
I Introduction
Webster's Dictionary defines civility as "deference or allegiance to the
social order befitting a citizen... observance of the forms of accepted social
behavior or adequate perfunctory politeness."1 Many scholars and observers
note that this quality is especially lacking in modern American courtrooms
among litigants, witnesses, observers, and members of the bar.2 The decline
in civility among lawyers has been attributed to many different factors,
including: growth in the profession;3 admission of poorly trained lawyers
to the bar;4 a general societal move toward incivility;' gender bias after the
admission of women to the bar;6 and a rise in "hardball" litigation tactics."
* J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A., The
University of Virginia.
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 413 (1993).
2. See generally Kara Anne Nagorney, A Noble Profession? A Discussion of Civility
Among Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815 (1999) (discussing the decline in lawyer
civility); John W. Frost, The Topic is Civility- You Got a Problem With That?, FLA. B. J., Jan.
1997 (suggesting ways to combat incivility in the legal profession); Catherine Therese Clarke,
Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945 (1991) (surveying courtroom
etiquette in Maryland).
3. SeeThomas Gibbs Gee& Bryan A. Garner, The UncivilLayer, 15 REV. LITIG. 177
(1996) (discussing the dramatic expansion of the bar as one explanation for incivility in the
courtroom). The authors propose that the decline in the sense of community among
members of the bar lessens the need to behave civilly. With the growth in the bar, the
necessity of continuing professional relationships is diminished. Id. at 181.
4. See Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62. Burger
proposed that one-third to one-half of attorneys are not qualified: "[This contributed to
large cost and delays in the courts. We know that a poorly trained, poorly prepared lawyer
often takes a week to try a one- or two-day case." Id. at 64.
5. See Frost, supra note 2, at 8. Frost argues that societal ill is not an excuse for
incivility in the bar. Id.
6. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 1009-11 (noting that some judges hold female attorneys
to a higher standard of courtroom etiquette than they do male attorneys).
7. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, PlayingHardba1, A.B.A.J.,July 1987, at 48. ("Hardball
is the name of the legal game. It explains why lawyers do things that might strike those
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This article explores the relationship between this perceived rise in
lawyer incivility and the heightened procedural bars that Virginia courts
employ for claims on appeal. Section two of the article focuses on the
historical ideal of civility in the courtroom; section three discusses modern
conceptions of civility; and sections four and five consider how procedural
bars factor into the declining standard of civility.
III History
In the nineteenth century there was little regulation of the legal profes-
sion apart from common law precedent.8 Aspirational essays such as George
Sharswood's "An Essay on Professional Ethics"9 offered some informal
structure to the ethical and professional considerations during this time.1"
Sharswood formulated the "gentleman-lawyer" ideal that served as the
model for many early ethics codes.11 Implicit in these early standards of the
legal profession was this ideal of the lawyer-statesmen.12 This ideal served
as a goal for those studying to become lawyers. 3
Around the turn of the century, states began to adopt formal ethics
codes, which were written in very broad language. 4 However, these codes
were not viewed so much as rules; rather, they were looked upon as goals."
In fact, there is a sense that lawyers in the past ascribed to unwritten rules
of tradition in their courtroom behavior. In 1984, Former Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger noted:
The professional standards and traditions of the bar in the past served to
restrain members of the profession from practices and customs common
and acceptable in the rough-and-tumble of the marketplace. Histori-
cally, honorable lawyers complied with traditions of the bar and re-
frained from doing all that the laws or the Constitution allowed them
to do. 6
outside the profession as mean spirited and just plain tacky.").
8. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 13 (3d ed.
1999).
9. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed., Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1993) (1896).
10. James E. Moliterno, Lauryer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 781, 787 (1997).
11. Id. at 788. See Sharswood, supra note 9.
12. Nagorney, supra note 2, at 817. Nagorney cites the gradual change in law, from a
profession to a business, as a reason for the disappearance of this ideal. Id.
13. Id.
14. Hazard, supra note 8, at 13.
15. Moliterno, supra note 10, at 788. One problem with articulating the standards of
conduct for past generations of the bar is that these traditions and standards of courtroom
etiquette were largely unwritten.
16. Burger, supra note 4, at 63.
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These professional traditions of the bar encompassed, to a large extent, the
concept of civility or good sportsmanship between the adversaries. Specific
examples of behavior encouraged in the past include: absolute silence in the
courtroom, addressing all spoken words to the judge rather than opposing
counsel, standing when making an objection, using formal titles when
addressing the bench as well as witnesses, and refraining from interrupting
opposing counsel in the midst of an argument."
Much of the evidence of a higher standard of civility in the past is
anecdotal."8 However, there is no shortage of such accounts. For example,
in a 1939 journal the legal profession was seen to embody good sportsman-
ship: "[N]o profession is so imbued with the chivalry of combat as is the
law.... It does not engender hatreds, jealousies, and envy. It does produce
respect, proper appraisement of ability, and warm friendship."19 Evidence
of a previously higher standard is also reflected in the current press and
public's perception of the profession.20 For example, lawyers are often
perceived as being personally antagonistic when they employ "hardball
litigation" tactics.
IX. Current Notions of Civility
In spite of this much-discussed rise in incivility, bar associations still
pay homage to these ideals of civility. For instance, the preamble to the
Virginia Bar Association22 Creed states:
The practice of law is and must remain a profession. As members of an
honored profession, lawyers are expected to exhibit the highest standards
of honesty and integrity. In addition, lawyers must strive to achieve a
sense of personal honor which should be manifested, in part, by a
vigorous devotion to civility in the courts, to clients and to other law-
yers. Courtesy is neither a relic of the past nor a sign of less than fully
committed advocacy. Courtesy is simply the mechanism by which
lawyers can deal with daily conflict without damaging their relationships
17. Clarke, supra note 2, at 987-997. Clarke surveyed Maryland judges for their
opinions on courtroom etiquette. The above examples are some of the areas in which the
judges recognized a decline in the unwritten standards of courtroom etiquette.
18. Gee & Garner, supra note 3, at 191.
19. Id. at 178 (quoting D.A. Frank, Good Sportsmanship, 2 TEX. B.J. 357 (1939)).
20. See Burger, supra note 4, at 62-63. See also Moliterno, supra note 10, at 782-84
("Lawyers, as well as the public, recognize the need for more integrity and civility in the legal
profession.").
21. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 48. Goldberg quotes a Chicago attorney's definition
of hardball as "when a lawyer, whether plaintiff's or defense, is personally antagonistic or
insistent on all of the procedural rules being followed." Id.
22. The Virginia Bar Association is a voluntary professional association, not the
regulator of the state bar.
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with their fellow lawyers. Toward that end, lawyers should aspire to the
... Principles of Professionalism. 23
Attorneys in Virginia also receive guidance about courtroom behavior
from the Ethical Considerations included in the Virginia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 4 These ethical considerations are aspirational in
nature and "represent the objectives toward which every member of the
profession should strive." 25 For example, Ethical Consideration 7-33 sug-
gests that courtroom proceedings should be "dignified" and "orderly" and
that a lawyer "should not engage in any conduct that offends the dignity
and decorum of proceedings." 26 In addition, the recently adopted Rules of
Professional Conduct (which modify the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity) will serve to guide courtroom behavior.2
IV Double Standard in Gray v. Netherland
One of the most pointed examples of the decline in civility is seen in
Gray v. Netherland.28 In Gray, the prosecutor informed defense attorneys
23. Virginia BarAssociation Creed (visited Apr. 4,2000) < http://www.vba.org//creed
.htm >.
24. The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility was amended by the adoption
of The Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 2000. See VA. SUP. CT.
R. PT. 6 S 2.
25. Preamble, VA. CODE PROF. RESP. (1999).
26. VA.SUP. CT. R. PT. 6S2, CODE PROF. RESP., EC 7-33. This section is amended by
VA. SUP. CT. R. PT. 6 S 2, R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.5. Rule 3.5(f) states that a "lawyer shall not
engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." This paragraph is new and its application
is broader than that of the Code section it amends. The Code proscribes such conduct only
if it would violate a rule of evidence or procedure. VA. CODE PROF. RESP. DR 7-105 (C)(5).
The comment to Rule 3.5 states:
The advocate's function is to present evidence and arguments so that the cause
may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous
conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. ...
An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and
preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by
belligerence or theatrics.
VA. SUP. CT. R. PT. 6 S 2, R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.5(f) cmt. 2: As this rule is so recently
adopted, no reported cases have yet interpreted it.
27. See supra note 26. The Rules of Professional Conduct omit the Code requirement
that lawyers "zealously" represent their clients. VA. CODE PROF. RESP. DR 7-101. Rule 1.3
(a) states that "a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client." VA. SUP. CT. R. PT. 6 S 2, R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.3. Thomas Spahn has noted that
the "diligence requirement represents a broader concept than the zealous representation
standard of the... Code and includes use of collaborative strategies when appropriate."
Thomas E. Spahn, Detailed Comparison Chart: Substantive Differences Between the Virginia
Rules ofProfessional Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility, in THE NEW VIRGINIA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT-A COMPARISON WITH THE CODE, VIRGINIA C.L.E.,
Apr. 1999, at 8.
28. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 166-170 (1996) (holding that petitioner's notice
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at the start of the trial that if Gray were found guilty, the Commonwealth
would introduce at sentencing Gray's statements about his participation in
an unsolved murder.29 On the evening that Gray was convicted of capital
murder, however, the prosecutor told Gray's attorneys that the Common-
wealth now intended to introduce additional evidence about the unsolved
murder.3 0 The sentencing phase of the trial began the next morning.
Gray's attorney made two motions to exclude this additional
evidence." In addition, the attorney explained that he was not "prepared
for any of this [additional evidence], other than [that the petitioner] may
have made some incriminating statements" and that the "defense was taken
by surprise." 2 Although Gray asked for more time to prepare for the
additional evidence, he did not specifically request a continuance." The
court denied the motions to exclude and did not provide Gray's attorney
any more time to prepare. A jury sentenced Gray to death based upon the
future dangerousness predicate of the Virginia capital murder statute.'
of evidence claim was barred because it was not raised in earlier proceedings).
29. Id. at 156-57. Defense counsel requested. disclosure of evidence relating to the
unsolved murder pre-trial:
Your Honor, this is my concern. We will probably at the very best stop in the
middle of the day or late in the afternoon and start the penalty trial the next day.
(W]e have go6d reason to believe that (the prosecutor] is going to call people
to introduce a statement that our client supposedly made to anotler inmate that
he murdered (the Sorrells] which were very violent and well-known crimes
throughout this entire area. If it comes in we are going to want to know it in
advance so we can be prepared on our argument.... It's absolute dynamite.
Id. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In response to this request,
the prosecutor specifically told defense attorneys that the only evidence he would introduce
on this point were statements made by Gray to Tucker (his co-defendant) or fellow inmates
about the unsolved murder. Id. at 157. The following conversation took place between the
prosecutor and defense counsel in chambers before the trial commenced:
MR. MOORE: Is it going to be evidence or just his statements?
MR. FERGUSON: Statements that your client made.
MR. MOORE: Nothing other than statements?
MR. FERGUSON: To other people, that's correct. Statements made by your client
that he did these things.
Id. at 173 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
30. Id. at 174. This evidence included crime scene photos, testimony of a state medical
examiner, and testimony of the investigating detective. Id.
31. Id. at 157. Counsel argued the evidence transcended the unadjudicated-crime
evidence allowed under Virginia law because "[i]n essence, what [the prosecutor is] doing is
trying [the unsolved] case in the minds of the jurors." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 158 & n.1. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999).
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Gray's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal and his petition for
state habeas relief was denied."
In federal habeas proceedings, Gray alleged that the Commonwealth's
late disclosure of the additional evidence made it impossible for defense
counsel to prepare for or defend against the evidence. 6 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that Gray was denied due process of law.37 The
Fourth Circuit reversed.38 The United States Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari and split the issue.39 The Court reasoned that Gray's due
process claim was actually two distinct claims: a misrepresentation claim
and a notice-of-evidence claim.' The Court held that the notice-of-evidence
claim was barred because it would require application of a new rule of law.41
The misrepresentation claim was remanded to the Fourth Circuit to deter-
mine both whether Gray raised the issue in earlier proceedings and whether
the Commonwealth preserved any defenses to the claim.42 On remand, the
Fourth Circuit held that the misrepresentation claim was procedurally
defaulted because it was not raised prior to being raised before the United
States Supreme Court.43
35. Gray, 518 U.S. at 158-59.
36. Id. at 159.
37. Id. at 160. The court stated that the Commonwealth's failure to provide fair notice
of the evidence it intended to use denied Gray due process. Id.
38. Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 67 (4th Cir. 1995).
39. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 169-70. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (concluding that
application "of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final
seriously undermines the principle of finality"). The Gray Court reasoned that defense
counsel conceded to the admission of the additional evidence and further that his plea for
additional time to prepare a defense did not constitute a motion for continuance. Gray, 518
U.S. at 167 nn.3-4. For that reason, the only way for Gray to have prevailed on this claim
would have been to establish (1) that due process requires more than one day's notice of the
evidence the Commonwealth intended to present and (2) that due process required a continu-
ance regardless of whether counsel sought one. Id. at 167. See generally C. Cooper Youell,
IV, Case Note, CAP. DEF. J., Fall 1996, at 4 (analyzing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152
(1996)).
42. Gray, 518 U.S. at 166.
43. Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d 158, 159 (4th Cir. 1996). The court examined both the
state and federal records and determined that Gray had not raised this claim in either forum.
The court specifically noted that Gray did not claim he had been misled by the Common-
wealth at the trial level. The court found that Gray's motion for exclusion of the evidence
was insufficient to constitute a misrepresentation claim. Id. at 162. On the federal record,
the court held that if Gray had previously raised the misrepresentation claim, the Common-
wealth would have been required to assert the affirmative defense of procedural default, or
waive it. Id. at 164. However, the court found that the claim had not been raised in the
lower courts and, accordingly, the "Commonwealth [was] free to maintain its defense of
procedural default." Id. at 166.
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Gray v. Netherland is indicative of the decline in civility in two re-
spects: (1) the prosecutor apparently lied to defense counsel about the
evidence he intended to present during the sentencing phase of the trial;"
and (2) Gray's notice claim was defaulted because his attorney did not use
the specific word "continuance" in his request for additional time to prepare
a defense to the surprise evidence.
A. Permitting Prosecutorial Misconduct Leads to Incivility
On the first point, section 19.2-264.3:2 of the Virginia Code mandates
that upon request of the defendant, the Commonwealth shall give notice in
writing of the "evidence of defendant's unadjudicated conduct" it intends to
use during the sentencing phase.4" Because the code section does not specifi-
cally state the time by which the notice must be given, it is incumbent upon
defense counsel not only to request the information, but also to pressure
continually the Commonwealth to comply with the request.46 By placing
this burden to "check up" on the prosecutor's work on the shoulders of
defense counsel, Gray and its progeny have heightened the nature of the
adversarial relationship between defense counsel and the Commonwealth.
Defense counsel are effectively required to nag the prosecutor in order to
avoid being surprised by new evidence at sentencing.
Gray illustrates the present disregard for the "gentleman-lawyer" ideal
of old. Specifically, while the Commonwealth is permitted to be less than
up-front when dealing with defense counsel, defense counsel is denied
redress because of a technicality-because the attorney stated that he was not
"prepared for any of this [additional evidence]" and that he "was taken by
44. See supra note 29-30 and accompanying text.
45. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 1999). The statute specifically requires
notice of the evidence of defendant's unadjudicated conduct. Id. The statute was enacted in
1993, after Coleman Gray's trial.
46. Section 19.2-263.3:2 of the Virginia Code states in part: "[The court shall specify
the time by which such notice shall be given." In addition, defense counsel may have to make
further motions on this point. See Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 270 (Va. 1996)
(holding notice sufficient to allow admission of testimony about acts not specifically stated
in Commonwealth's notice to defendant). In Barnabei, the Commonwealth filed notice,
pursuant to section 19.2-264.3:2, that Barnabei had "engaged in a continuous course of
threatening and assaultive conduct against [his wife], said conduct occurring on such a
continuous and regular basis that [his wife could not] recall each and every specific date and
occasion." Id. at 280. The court found the Commonwealth's notice sufficient to allow the
admission of testimony about incidents not specifically alleged in the notice. Id. Therefore,
if the Commonwealth 's response to defendant's request for notice of evidence is vague,
defense counsel may need to make further motions in order to clarify exactly what evidence
the Commonwealth intends to use at sentencing. See Lisa M. Jenio, Case Note, CAP. DEF.
J., Fall 1996, at 41 (analyzing Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 270 (Va. 1996)).
Furthermore, defense counsel should make it explicit that the Commonwealth must provide
evidence of the acts, not just notice of which acts it intends to introduce. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 1999).
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surprise" rather than specifically requesting a "continuance."47 Such a
dichotomy places opposing counsel in roles more adversarial than in the
past. .
B. Operation of Procedural Default to Increase Incivility
The rules of professional conduct and traditional notions of courtroom
etiquette are not the only influences on a lawyer's in-court behavior.
Attorneys are obviously bound by procedural and evidentiary rules as
well.48 Of particular concern to the criminal defense attorney are the
procedural rules governing the preservation of claims for future appeal.49
In light of the nearly impossible showing of "cause and prejudice" necessary
to overcome procedural default and obtain federal habeas review of a claim,
it is critical that attorneys "preserve the record" at the trial-court level."0
Gray highlights exactly how easy it is to default a claim in Virginia.
The ease with which the courts find claims to be defaulted has a large
impact on courtroom civility."1 In Gray, the Court's refusal to infer that
defense counsel desired a continuance from his plea for additional time to
prepare enhances the need to create an adequate record for future review of
the claim. 2 Defense attorneys who find themselves in this situation now
have to make a myriad of objections and motions in order to make sure the
claim is properly preserved. Counsel should seek additional time to pre-
47. Gray, 518 U.S. at 157.
48. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-678 (Michie 1999) (allowing for harmless-error
review of errors at the trial court level); VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-654 (Michie 1999) (setting
forth procedural default rules for habeas review).
49. See generally Matthew K. Mahoney, Bridging theProcedural Default Chasm, 12 CAP.
DEF. J. 305 (2000) (suggesting method by which defense counsel can "make record" and avoid
procedural default); Carey L. Cooper, The Never Ending Story: Combating Procedural Bars in
Capital Cases, CAP. DEF. J., Spring 1997, ai38 (discussing developments in Virginia's interpre-
tation of procedurally barred claims).
50. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (holding that a cause and
prejudice exception to procedural default will allow review of federal constitutional claims
when, in the absence, defendant would suffer a miscarriage of justice); United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982) (stating that proper standard of review for a procedurally defaulted
motion is "cause and actual prejudice") (citation omitted); United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d
888, 891 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing "actual prejudice" standard employed in Frady). See generally
Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1952-55 (1999) (holding that Strickler did not establish
the requisite prejudice necessary to excuse the procedural default of his Brady claim). In
Strickler, the United States Supreme Court found that evidence known to the Common-
wealth and requested by, but not disclosed to, defense counsel was prejudicial to defendant.
Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1954. However, this finding was not enough to overcome the
"prejudice" requirement necessary to excuse procedural default of a claim. Id. at 1954-55.
51. See infra notes 56-86 and accompanying text.
52. The Court relied upon the reasoning employed by the Fourth Circuit: "If the
defense felt unprepared to undertake effective cross-examination, one would think a formal
motion for continuance would have been forthcoming, but none was ever made." Gray, 518
U.S. at 167 n.4 (citing Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 64 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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pare, move to exclude the surprise evidence, move for a continuance in
order to adequately prepare for cross-examination of witnesses or to build
a defense to evidence, and perhaps argue that due process requires more
notice of the Commonwealth's evidence. 3 Furthermore, the procedural
default rules, as evidenced in Gray, serve to preclude defense counsel from
enjoying some of the recognized benefits of civility, such as not alienating
the judge or jury. 4 Criminal defense attorneys frequently find themselves
faced with a difficult choice: zealous representation versus civility.
5 1
V Overcoming Procedural Default: A De Facto Exception to Civility
Gray is not the only case that illustrates the conflict between traditional
notions of civility and the incessant objections required to preserve the
criminal trial record for review. Though some scholars and writers are
careful to distinguish between incivility and zealous representation, 6 the
line is not always clear. In criminal cases, defense attorneys must make
more objections than ever before. In recent years, it has become clear that
to avoid default of the issue, trial counsel must promptly make every
motion, objection, and proffer during trial.5 7 Specifically, to preserve a
claim, attorneys are required to interrupt opposing counsel during argu-
ment, make multiple objections to some evidence,' and state the grounds
for objection narrowly and broadly.' Considering these requirements for
53. See Youell, supra note 41. The majority opinion declined to recognize the argument
that due process requires more notice, stating that only the adoption of a new constitutional
rule could establish this proposition. Gray, 518 U.S. at 167. But see id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("There is nothing 'new' in a rule that capital difendants must be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to defend against the State's penalty phase evidence.").
54. See discussion infra part V.
55. The prosecution also has an obligation to act civilly. However, some authors have
suggested that the harmless error rule promotes prosecutorial misconduct. See Addison K.
Goff, Mixed Signals: A Look at Louisiana's Experience with Harmless Error in Criminal Cases,
59 LA. L. REV. 1169, 1177 (1999) (examining Louisiana's standard of appellate review). Goff
states that "in cases in which the evidence does not weigh heavily against the defendant, the
increasing possibility of an error being said to be harmless can give the prosecutor an
incentive to act unethically." Id. Goff cites United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1395
(7th Cir. 1987) (derogatory remarks about defense attorney not proper, but harmless) and
United States v. Lowenberg, 858 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1988) (improper, but harmless, to call
defendant a "filthy pimp" and defense counsel a "jack-in-the-box" for making repeated
objections) to show situations in which federal courts found prosecutorial misconduct to be
harmless. Id. at n.55 (citing Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV.
393, 428 n.226 (1992)).
56. See Goldberg, supra note 7.
57. See Cooper, supra note 49.
58. See discussion infra Part V.A.
59. See discussion infra Part V.B.
60. See discussion infra Part V.C. Additionally, counsel must be aware of the default
traps on appeal. For example, counsel must: specifically allege each assignment of error both
2000)
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preserving the record, it is no surprise that defense attorneys are criticized
for demonstrating a lack of civility.6 '
A. Objection During Argument
The following cases illustrate that, in the capital defense context,
defense counsel must interrupt the Commonwealth immediately when an
error or prejudicial statement occurs during argument. This practice is
problematic for many reasons. First, in creating and maintaining such rules,
the courts remove much tactical decision-making power from the attorney.
Clearly, attorneys might desire not to interrupt opposing counsel during
argument in order that they not anger either the prosecutor or the bench."
They might also fear antagonizing the jury with seemingly rude conduct.
However, these considerations must be weighed against the need to make
the record for future appeals.
In Clarke's survey of Maryland judges, some respondents reported that
they believed it was an egregious breach of courtroom etiquette to interrupt
opposing counsel in the midst of his or her argument: "Such behavior
distracts the decision maker's collection of information, interrupts the flow
of the proceedings, and causes inefficiency in court proceedings."63 In
Virginia, however, criminal defense attorneys have no choice but to inter-
rupt opposing counsel during argument.
In Russo v. Commonweath, 64 for example, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that defendant waived his objection to an improper statement
narrowly and broadly and advance the same argument used at trial in support of an objection
on appeal. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. After preserving a claim at trial and
properly assigning the claim as error, the claim will still be defaulted unless fully briefed.
This task is made difficult by the constraints of Rule 5:26 which imposes a fifty-page limit on
appellate briefs. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5.26(a). See also appendix to this article.
61. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 48-50 (noting that much of what the public deems
"hardball" in criminal cases is actually necessary in order to build a defense).
62. See Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1349 (4th Cit. 1996) (recognizing that
refraining from objecting is a reasonable trial practice if done in order to avoid an overly
antagonistic appearance to the jury). In Bennett, the defendant claimed on habeas that his
trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth's sentencing
arguments. Id. The court found trial counsel's explanation for the failure to object to be
standard trial practice: "Trial counsel, on the other hand, explain in their affidavits that they
intentionally refrained from objecting, not out of despair, but because they did not want to
appear overly antagonistic to the jury and wanted to portray themselves as 'the good guys.'"
Id. See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 183 n.14 (1986) (finding that defense
counsel's decision not to object to prosecutor's improper closing was tactical).
63. See Clarke, supra note 2, at 997. See also James McElhaney, When to Object, A.B.A.
J., June 1989, at 98. McElhaney notes that the general rule is that counsel must object
immediately or lose the objection. However, he cites a 1936 case to suggest that this was not
always the case. In that case, the court "said the objection could be made at the time of the
remark or at the close of the argument- which has the advantage of encouraging civility."
Id. at 99 (citing London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 325 (8th Ci. 1936)).
64. 148 S.E.2d 820 (Va. 1966).
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made by the Commonwealth during its opening statement because he
waited until the conclusion of the statement to object to it.6 s In the same
trial, the Commonwealth's Attorney improperly offered his own opinion
about the defendant's guilt during the closing argument.'6 Defense counsel
objected to this statement and the court admonished the prosecutor to keep
his opinions out of the argument. Defense counsel did not renew his
objection at the end of the argument and the claim was deemed waived on
appeal.
67
More recently, Brandon v. Commonwealth" reemphasized the impor-
tance of making a timely objection during argument. 9 In Brandon, defense
counsel waited until the end of the Commonwealth's opening statement to
move for a mistrial on the grounds that the Commonwealth improperly
discussed acts which were not included in the indictment and charges.7 The
court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the objection was untimely.'
B. Renewing Objections
Frequent objections are another area in which attorneys must be
concerned with alienating the jury. There is some suggestion that juries
interpret objections as an attorney's attempt to "keep something from the
65. Russo v. Commonwealth, 148 S.E.2d 820,824-25 (Va. 1966). In Russo, the prosecu-
tor speculated during his opening statement about events that would occur if defendant were
to be acquitted of the charge. Id. at 825. The defendant stated that he preferred not to
interrupt the Commonwealth during argument and the court held that his motion for
mistrial was properly overruled because the objection occurred too late. Id. at 825.
66. Id. The prosecutor stated: "[1]f I did not believe the evidence in this caseproved
his guilt, of Dr. Russo, beyond a reasonable doubt, I would withdraw right here and now."
Id.
67. Id. The court relied on Gall v. Tea Company, 120 S.E.2d 378,381 (Va. 1961) ("The
failure of counsel to save the point, or take an exception, may well lull the court into
believing that counsel acquiesced in its ruling")..
68. No. 2434-98-2, 2000 WL 14183 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2000).
69. Brandon v. Commonwealth, No. 2434-98-2, 2000 WL 14183, at *1 (Va. Ct. App.
Jan. 11, 2000).
70. Id. The court further held the objection made after opening statement did not
constitute a timely objection when defendant failed to object to the same evidence when it
was introduced at trial. Therefore, there was no problem with the admission of the acts not
included in the indictment at trial because defendant did not object at that point. Id.
71. Id. The court dismissed this claim summarily, relying upon Yeatts v. Common-
wealth, 410 S.E.2d 254 (Va. 1991) and Russo, 148 S.E.2d at 825. In Yeatts, the court stated that
"[m]aking a timely motion for mistrial means making the motion when the objectionable
words are spoken." Yeatts, 410 S.E.2d at 264 (internal citations omitted). See also Mack v.
Commonwealth, 454 S.E.2d 750, 752 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (holding defendant's objection
untimely when made at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's dosing argument); Cheng
v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 599, 606 (Va. 1990) (holding that defendant's motion for
mistrial was untimely when made after the jury retired).
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judge and jury."' Understandably, counsel might desire to limit the num-
ber of objections in order to avoid the appearance of attempting to deceive
the jury or to avoid annoying the judge. However, in Virginia, one objec-
tion may not always be enough to protect the record.
In Beavers v. Commonwealth,3 the court held that the defendant waived
any objection to exclusion for cause of three jurors who expressed opposi-
tion to the death penalty because he objected only after the jury had been
selected and sworn. Beavers did not object at the time each juror was
excused.74
Additionally, when counsel fails to renew an objection, the court may
assume that defendant has acquiesced and no longer wishes to raise that
objection. In Breard v. Commonwealth,"5 defense counsel moved to strike
a juror for cause during voir dire.76 The judge denied the motion but told
counsel that he would rehear the motion at the close of voir dire.77 The
defendant failed to renew the motion'at that time and the objection was
deemed waived.78 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the denial,
stating that the judge "reasonably could have assumed that Breard acqui-
esced in seating [the juror]." 9 In light of these cases, counsel must make
two objections when challenging a juror for cause-once at the initial grant
or denial and then again at the time the jury is'sworn.
C Groundsfor Objection
Counsel's concern about the number of objections made during trial
is compounded not only by the need to object several times to certain pieces
of evidence, but also by the requirement that the same objection be framed
several ways. Frequently, counsel will need to state objections narrowly
and broadly in order to avoid procedural default of the issue."0
72. McElhaney, supra note 63, at 98. McElhaney argues that an attorney has "a limited
good-will account with the judge and jury at the start of the trial. Everything you do in the
trial affects the account ... [and an objection] usually counts as a withdrawal." Id.
73. 427 S.E.2d 411 (Va. 1993).
74. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 411, 418 (Va. 1993); see also Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d. 785, 793 (Va. 1989).
75. 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994).
76. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 677 (Va. 1994).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Breard also defaulted another motion for mistrial by waiting to object to the
testimony of a witness he felt was prejudicial. Id. at 678. He objected to the testimony of the
victim's mother before she took the stand. The mother was allowed to take the stand and
Breard made no further objection. As she left the witness stand, she was crying. Breard
waited until the court recessed for lunch and then objected on the grounds that the testimony
was prejudicial and irrelevant. The court held the motion was untimely. Id.
80. See supra note 60.
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In Yeatts v. .Angelone8' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the Supreme Court of Virginia's finding of proce-
dural default of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.8" The court
agreed that the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel was defaulted
because it did not specifically challenge the lower court's substantive
ruling.83 Conversely, in Sheppard v. Commonwealth,84 the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that the defendant procedurally defaulted his specific claim
because he made no general assignment of error.8"
Although those cases deal with habeas review of claims, they are
instructive for trial counsel because the same reasoning could easily apply
at trial. After these cases, it is clear that counsel must allege every claim,
narrowly and broadly, in order to preserve the record for meaningful appeal
because the issue will be defaulted if not properly raised at trial. As a result,
counsel is effectively required to make every objection on every available
ground, in order that the best arguments and issues remain available for
future review."
V Conclusion
Courtroom civility is not as prevalent as it once was. This decline has
been attributed to many factors.8 In Virginia, procedural bars have contrib-
uted to the decline of civility in the courtroom by forcing counsel to be at
times rude and overly-persistent. In order to properly protect the record for
appeal, counsel must offer numerous objections of every aspect for which
there might be a claim of error. In this way, procedural default hurts the
81. 166 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1999).
82. Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Matthew K.
Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF.J. 393 (1999) (analyzing Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255
(4th Cir. 1999)).
83. Yeatts, 166 F.3d at 264-65.
84. 464 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1995).
85. Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131, 139 (Va. 1995). In Sheppard, the
defendant made several specific assignments of error arising in the sentencing proceeding, but
did not allege generally that the jury's finding of future dangerousness was in error. Id. at
138-39. See also Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 373 (1999) (analyzing Sheppard v.
Taylor, No. 98-12, 1998 WL 743663 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998)) (suggesting that after the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's habeas review of this case, counsel are now
required to include general objections along with every specific one).
86. _ See Youell, supra note 41. In addition, counsel must be careful to support claims
on appeal with the same arguments made at trial. See Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d
114 (Va. 1996). In Goins, the defendant objected at the trial court to the admission of
evidence on the grounds of relevancy. Id. at 128. On appeal, he argued both relevancy and
prejudice. Id. The court declined to rule on the assignment of error on the grounds of
prejudice because the argument was not advanced at trial. Id. This rule underscores the
importance of objecting to a claim with multiple arguments so that counsel can use the best
argument on appeal.
87. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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system and the defendant. The system is subjected to more "hardball
litigation" which engenders negative perceptions in the public and encour-
ages attorneys to be uncooperative with their opponents. Additionally
defense counsel is faced with a very difficult choice: if he is perceived as
rude, he risks antagonizing the judge and jury, but if he tries to behave
politely, he risks procedural default of the issue. Finally, the procedural
bars have placed opposing counsel in heightened adversarial roles, which by
requiring numerous and repetitive objections at the trial level, in effect




Objection During Argument: Defense counsel must immediately object in
order to preserve any claim of improper argument. Additionally, counsel
must object to each offensive part of the argument. In order to make a
timely objection, counsel must interrupt opposing counsel immediately
when an error or prejudicial statement occurs. See generally Mack v. Com-
monwealth, 454 S.E.2d 750, 751 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that objection
at the close of Commonwealth's argument was not timely); Cheng v.
Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 599,606-07 (Va. 1990) (holding that defendant's
motion for mistrial was untimely when made after the jury retired); Russo
v. Commonwealth, 148 S.E.2d 820, 824-25 (Va. 1966) (holding that defen-
dant waived objection to improper statement made by the Commonwealth
during opening argument because he waited until the conclusion of the
argument to object to the statement).
Renewal of Certain Objections: Counsel must renew objections to jurors.
If counsel wishes to object to exclusion of jurors for cause, he must object
at the time each juror is excused, and again when the jury is empaneled.
Likewise, if defense counsel wants to strike a juror for cause, he must object
during voir dire and again when the jury is sworn. See generally Beavers v.
Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 411 (Va. 1993); Breard v. Commonwealth, 445
S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994).
Objecting Narrowly and Broadly: In framing an assignment of error,
counsel should state the specific claim narrowly and also make a general
assignment of error as to the finding. See Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255,
264 (4th Cir. 1999); Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1995).
Furthermore, counsel needs to preserve both claims at the trial court level.
Failure to do so may preclude review under Rule 5:25. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25
("Error will not be sustained as to any ruling of the court unless the objec-
tion was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except
for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.").
See generally Fisher v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 46, 50 (1988) (holding
assignments of error defaulted because defendant failed to make contempo-
raneous objections at trial). Frequently, this requires the same objection to
be stated several different ways. In addition, all objections should be feder-
alized.
Assigning and Briefing All Non-Frivolous Claims: Under Rule 5:17, all
claims must be assigned and briefed. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17. This proce-
dure is constrained by the fifty-page limit on appellate briefs imposed by
Rule 5:26. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:26. Counsel needs to address all claims,
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narrowly and broadly, on state and federal grounds, within the fifty-page
limit. Ironically, this may not even be enough. In Weeks v. Angelone, the
United States Supreme Court suggested that the claim before the Court was
a low priority for defendant as it was the forty-fourth claim of forty-seven
assigned. Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727, 734 (2000). See Heather L.
Necklaus, Case Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 387 (2000) (analyzing Weeks v.
Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000)).
Advancing the Same Argument on Appeal: Counsel must use the same
argument in support of an objection on appeal as was used at trial. See
Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E. 2d 114, 128 (Va. 1996) (declining to rule
on an assignment of error on the grounds of prejudice because that argu-
ment was not advanced at trial). As is the case with choosing the grounds
for the objection, counsel may need to object on the same point with
different arguments in order to preserve the appropriate issue for appeal.
